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VOLUME XXII APRIL, 1948 NUMBER 2
LOCAL RENT CONTROL- AN EXPERIMENT
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW *-t
0 N JUNE 30, 1947, a new Federal Rent Control Act came
into effect.1  The drive, which had begun sometime prior
thereto, for the removal of federal price controls, 2 resulted
naturally in a lessening also of rent control by Congress. It
was inevitable that the stringent wartime rigorous mainte-
nance, through the Office of Price Administration, of federal
control over rents and eviction of tenants should be weak-
ened as part of the general policy of Congress to taper all
controls to a minimum. It was likewise inevitable that the
special circumstances which obtained in various localities
should be differently affected by this new national legislation.
So it was in the City of New York and in a number of
other large cosmopolitan centers. There, the need for more
rigorous control was still felt, for the housing shortages were
more especially acute in these centers and the effort to meet
these shortages by new construction was, for a number of
reasons, not equal to the unprecedented demand.
Primarily, the new statute made but few vital changes 3
* Because of the importance of this article, publication of the Ravmw was
delayed in order that several pertinent recent decisions might be included.
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mary K. Burns, member
of the legal staff of the Temporary City Housing Rent Commission, for her
helpful assistance in the preparation of this article.161 STAT. 193, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1881 (Supp. 1947).
256 STAT. 23, § 2(b) (1942), as amended, 59 STAT. 306, 50 U. S. C. App.
§902(b) (Supp. 1945).
a (A) Criminal sanctions applicable to violations of the Act were elim-
inated but violators could be held in contempt of court for disobeying an in-junction or mandate requiring obedience to the Act.
(B) Contrary to the former practice, under the new Act the tenant was
the only one authorized to sue the landlord for treble damages.
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in rent regulation, but these changes were important and
created many new problems which, at least in New York
City, had to be dealt with governmentally. For example, the
(C) The area rent offices were divested of their jurisdiction over eviction
proceedings. The entire subject being assigned to the local courts with specific
limitations for grounds for evictions. Section 209 of the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947 containing such limitations provides as follows:
(a). No action or proceeding to recover possession of any controlled hous-
ing accommodations with respect to which a maximum rent is in effect
under this title shall be maintainable by any landlord against any
tenant in any court, notwithstanding the fact that the tenant has no
lease or that his lease has expired, so long as the tenant continues to
pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled unless-
(1) under the law of the state in which the action or proceeding is
brought the tenant is (A) violating the obligation of his tenancy(other than an obligation to pay rent higher than rent permitted
under this Act or an obligation to surrender possession of such
housing accommodations) or (B) is committing a nuisance in
such housing accommodations or using such housing accommo-
dations for an immoral or illegal purpose or for other than living
or dwelling purposes;
(2) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of such
housing accommodations for his immediate and personal use and
occupancy as housing accommodations;
(3) the landlord has in good faith contracted in writing to sell the
housing accommodations to a purchaser for the immediate and
personal use and occupancy as housing accommodations by such
purchaser;
(4) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of such
housing accommodations for the immediate purpose of substan-
tially altering, remodeling, or demolishing them and replacing
them with new construction, and the altering or remodeling is
reasonably necessary to protect and conserve the housing accom-
modations and cannot practically be done with the tenant in oc-
cupancy, and the landlord has obtained such approval as may be
required by Federal, State, or local law for the alterations, re-
modeling, or any construction planned; or
(5) the housing accommodations are nonhousekeeping, furnished
housing accommodations located within a single dwelling unit
not used as a rooming or boarding house and the remaining por-
tion of which is occupied by the landlord or his immediate family.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the United States
or any state or local public agency may maintain an action or pro-
ceeding to recover possession of any housing accommodations oper-
ated by it where such action or proceeding is authorized by the statute
or regulations under which such accommodations are administered:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to authorize
the maintenance of any such action or proceeding upon the ground
that the income of the occupants of the housing accommodations ex-
ceeds the allowable maximum unless such income, less any amounts
paid to such occupants by the Veterans' Administration on account
of service-connected disability or disabilities, exceeds the allowable
maximum.
(D) A landlord and his tenant could by voluntary lease agreement provide
for an increase not in excess of 15% provided the lease was entered into prior
to December 31, 1947, to become effective after July 1, 1947 and extended
up to or after December 31, 1948.
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complete decontrol of hotels 4 presented a special problem
to the residents of New York City, for, in New York City
alone there are some 500 hotels containing more than 50,000
tenants. If the hotel owners were permitted, in 1947, to
increase rents to the level of competitive rates, many thou-
sands of these tenants would have been unable to meet their
obligations or to find other housing accommodations. Again,
the transfer to the courts of the task of passing, in the first
instance, upon applications for eviction of tenants on the
numerous grounds permitted under the federal law almost
immediately resulted in an enormous increase of eviction
proceedings in the New York City Municipal Courts 5 which,
if allowed to go unchecked, would have resulted in making
many people homeless. So too, the decontrol of new build-
ings or remodelled structures had a like effect.
While the country as a whole was perhaps in a position
to weather these restorations of the rights of landlords, in
the City of New York, the problem was at once difficult and
perilous to the health and safety of the community.
The Legislature of the State of New York was not in
session on June 30, 1947, nor had it, during the brief session
that preceded the effective date of the new Act, contemplated
the consequences of the proposed federal action. It did, in-
deed, contemplate and provide for the complete cessation of
federal control,6 but the partial lifting of these controls left
the people of the city remediless.
It was at this point that the government of the city was
compelled to take action, and a series of local laws were
(E) Hotels, including those having permanent residents were completely
decontrolled, providing certain conditions and requirements were met.
(F) Certain classes of housing accommodations were made eligible for
decontrol, i.e., new buildings and remodeled structures.
4n defining "controlled housing accommodations" the Act excludes hotels
referring to them as ". . . any establishment which is commonly known as a
hotel in the community in which it is located, . . . occupied by persons
who are provided customary hotel services such as maid service, furnishing
and laundering of linen, telephone and secretarial or desk service, use and
upkeep of furniture and fixtures, and bell-boy service ... " 61 STAT. 196,
50 U. S. C. APP. § 1892 (Supp. 1947).
5 In June, 1947: 1,753 cases; July, 1947:1,761 cases; August, 1947: 2,144
cases; September 1-17: 3,788 cases. These figures do not include eviction
proceedings brought for the non-payment of rent.6 Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 274, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1947, c. 704.
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enacted, primarily intended to deal with this emergency
situation.7 The creation of a municipal administrative
agency to deal with this emergency problem and the formu-
lation of rules and regulations for its conduct, and the review
of its activities in the courts, is the subject matter of this
paper.
The first of the local laws in point of time was Local
Law No. 54, which created the Temporary City Housing Rent
Commission and put the permanent guests in hotels, decon-
trolled under the Federal Act, under the protection of the
newly appointed Commission. By the terms of the new law,
rents were frozen as of June 30, 1947, and evictions, or ex-
clusions from possession, could take place only after a cer-
tificate had been issued by the Commission.8
Subsequently, the City Council likewise enacted addi-
tional laws to protect tenants other than those living in
hotels from the dangers of eviction, providing that except
for the non-payment of rent, no tenant could be evicted and
no proceeding to evict a tenant could be brought in any court
without a certificate from the new Commission, except at
the risk of criminal consequence.9 The statutes limited
specifically the grounds upon which the Commission was au-
thorized to issue certificates, and these grounds were more
favorable to the tenant than the grounds which were pro-
vided in the federal legislation.'0
7 Local Laws 1947 (City of New York), No. 54, §§ U41-6.0, U41-7.0,
U41-8.0, U41-9.0.
a Local Laws 1947 (City of New York), No. 54, § U41-6.0. This law
prescribed three grounds upon which a tenant may be evicted from a hotel,
rooming house or lodging house, or upon which a landlord may be given a
certificate. Those grounds relate to:
(a) Tenant's refusal to renew a lease;
(b) tenant's refusal to permit the landlord access to his accomodations;
and
(c) the violation of the obligation of the tenancy or the commission of a
nuisance.
9 Each violation of an order or regulation of the Commission could subject
the offender to punishment by a fine of $500 or ninety days in prison, or both.
Local Laws 1947 (City of New York), No. 66, § U41-7.0(k).
1OThe grounds upon which the Commission may issue Certificates of
Eviction are:
(a) The tenant is violating an obligation of his tenancy, other than the
obligation to pay rent;
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As soon as the Commission was organized; published its
regulations, and commenced to function, it encountered, as
is usual with all newly born administrative agencies, the
problem of the constitutionality of the statute of its creation.
And in the case of the City Rent Commission, the problem
was further complicated by the broad language in which the
local laws were phrased and the wide powers which were
given to the Commission.
It was not long before the courts, in reviewing the acts
of the Commission, were in disagreement both as to the con-
stitutionality of the statute and their interpretation. A
learned judge in the Second Department held," for example,
that the city laws were in conflict with state legislation and
hence beyond the power of the city to enact,' 2 and his views
were in due course upheld by the Appellate Division of the
Second Department.'" Another judge, in the First Depart-
ment, 1 4 found the Commission's action under Local Law 54
"brash and lawless," and was unable to see how the statute
in question authorized the Commission to make the orders
which had emanated from it. The specific determinations
(b) the tenant has an obligation to surrender possession of his apartment;
(c) the tenant is committing a nuisance which interferes substantially
with the comfort or safety of other tenants or where the tenant is
using the apartment for an immoral or illegal purpose or for other
than living or dwelling purposes;
(d) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the apart-
ment for his immediate and personal use and occupancy as housing
accommodations subject to specified restrictions;
(e) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession for the im-
mediate purpose of substantially altering, remodeling or demolishing
in accordance with certain requirements which greatly limit the ap-
plication of this section, because the landlord is required to show that
the alteration, etc., is reasonably necessary to maintain safety of such
buildings or structure or that the demolition will result in a greater
number of apartments than were contained in the structure to be
demolished or that the alteration will result in a greater number of
apartments.
Furthermore, provisions are included which permit the tenant to remain
in possession of a portion of the premises while the alterations or improve-
ments are being made and which result in giving the tenant a pre-emptive
right to occupancy.
11 Tartaglia v. McLoughlin, 190 Misc. 266, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
12N .Y. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 12; CiTr HomE RuLE LAW § 11(2).
13 Tartaglia v. McLoughlin, 273 App. Div. 821, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 305 (2d
Dep't 1948).
14 Moukad v. Ross, 191 Misc. 270, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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of -the Commission were likewise set aside by the courts with
embarrassing frequency, until it began to appear that almost
every order made by the Commission could be reviewed in
the courts as a matter of course and its reasonableness
subjected to judicial scrutiny. 15 The whole history of ad-
ministrative procedure and the development of the doctrine
that administrative determinations which are within the four
corners of the statutory authority, must be upheld, unless
they were palpably arbitrary or unreasonable, seemed for a
long time to have been ignored. The reasons for this adverse
judicial attitude, being psychological, can only be left to
conjecture.16 Perhaps the courts were unfamiliar with ad-
ministrative agencies of this character, created by municipal
legislation. Again, the drive for decontrol, which .had begun
in Congress, had made people restive with the restoration of
controls by municipal legislation and constituted a major
inarticulate premise which resulted in judicial impatience
with the action of the Commission.
Under these circumstances, though the immediate emer-
gency had been met and the process of eviction had been
15 Chapman v. Ross, 118 N. Y. L. J. 1916 (Sup. Ct. December 30, 1947);
Matter of Keller v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 708 (Sup. Ct. February 25, 1948) ;
Matter of Lawrence v. Ross, 191 Misc. 88, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ;
LeCapria v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 708 (Sup. Ct. February 25, 1948); Matter
of Caputa v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 787 (Sup. Ct. March 2, 1948); Matter of
Boehner v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1017 (Sup. Ct. March 18, 1948); Moukad
v. Ross, 191 Misc. 270, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Matter of
Grimeisen v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1368 (Sup. Ct. April 13, 1948); Matter
of Arnoff v. Ross, 191 Misc. 469, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 425 (Sup. Ct 1948); Matter
of Rabinoff v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1918 (Sup. Ct. May 21, 1948).
16 After this paper was prepared two decisions were handed down in the
First Department by Mr. Justice Walter; Matter of Lederman v. Ross, 120
N. Y. L. J. 67 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1948), and Matter of Lubin v. Finkelstein,
120 N. Y. L. J. 75 (Sup. Ct. July 14, 1948). In both of these cases orders
increasing rents in hotels were upheld by the learned justice. In the first
case the Commission's comparability formula was upheld, and in the second
case, the Commission's hardship formula. It is interesting, however, that the
opinion of Mr. Justice Walter in the second case very extensibly treated the
powers of the Commission and compared its function with that of any public
utility rate making body. Of special importance in clearing the status of the
Rent Commission is the following language used by Mr. Justice Walter:
"I thus hold that the commission's formula is legal, and the remaining ques-
tion is whether there is evidence to sustain its findings of fact as to values
and results of operation; for if there be evidence which fairly sustains its
findings, I may not substitute my judgment for that of the commission or
upset their order merely because if I were sitting as a trier of the facts with




halted, and the spiral of rent increases in hotels had been
stopped, it was obvious that the usefulness of the Commission
as a governmental agency would not endure if the legal bases
of its decisions were not established.
To accomplish this result, the Commission proceeded on
two fronts: it sought, through the city administration, and
procured from Albany, legislation curing the conflict which
was said to have existed between the state and the local laws;
and at the same time, it prosecuted appeals to the higher
courts of the decisions of the courts at nisi priu so as to get
definitive holdings with regard to its power and position as
a local administrative agency.
The enabling acts 17 which were adopted by the state
legislature specifically authorized the City Council to adopt
legislation of the character here involved and ratified the
acts of the City Council theretofore adopted. When the
Court of Appeals finally reversed the lower courts which had
declared Local Law 66 unconstitutional, it did not in terms
meet the problem of the conflict between the state and the
local laws.18 By the time the Court of Appeals had to deal
with the problem, the enabling acts were already on the books
and it was not necessary to pass upon the academic question
which was raised before and passed upon by the lower courts.
It is, therefore, still unknown whether an emergency of the
type which existed on June 30, 1947, is sufficient ground to
justify a municipality in passing local laws inconsistent with
state legislation. That such emergencies could exist is, of
course, obvious. If a city is threatened by pestilence or flood,
or other immediate danger, it seems most unlikely that it
would have to await either the regular session of the legis-
lature or a special session to deal with an immediate problem.
Certainly, in such cases, private rights must yield to the pub-
lic welfare, and it would be difficult to imagine that any
court would enjoin the necessary conduct of the municipality
on such occasions. The problem here presented was whether
the particular emergency was of sufficient severity to jus-
tify the action of the City Council. That problem never was
17 Laws of N. Y. 1948, cc. 4, 669.8 Tartaglia v. McLoughlin, 297 N. Y. 419, 79 N. E. 2d 809 (1948).
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solved because its solution was obviated by the prompt action
of the state legislature in ratifying the local laws, and in
approving their extension. It is submitted, however, that
the emergency which confronted the city was a serious one,
and the prospect of having many thousands of tenants evicted
from their homes or of permitting rents to rise to unprece-
dented heights in a competitive market, was sufficiently seri-
ous to justify prompt measures by the local government. In
presenting the case, however, to the lower courts, counsel for
the administrative agency did not adequately present the
seriousness of the situation, and we believe that the lower
courts were misled into making decisions adverse to the Com-
mission in the early days by inadequate factual presentations.
Local Law 54, as has been stated above, froze the rents
of permanent residents in hotels at the June 30, 1947, levels. 19
The Commission, however, was authorized to make such
orders adjusting rents as might be necessary to correct in-
equities. It was necessary for the Commission, therefore,
under the powers conferred upon it by the City Council, to
establish by regulation the inequities which would be dealt
with and the formulae which would be adopted for raising
rents in particular cases where such inequities existed. The
exercise of these powers by the Commission proved a fertile
source of disagreement between the Commission and the
courts, for here, as elsewhere, some of the judges at nisi prius
were unwilling to afford to the local Commission the status
enjoyed by other administrative agencies. The Commission,
therefore, had to run the gauntlet of adverse decisions in the
lower courts before its authority was upheld in the appellate
courts.
Four methods were adopted by the Commission for deal-
ing with rental inequities in hotels:
(a) It first approved voluntary increases of rent to the
extent of 15% by agreements between the landlord
and tenant. The agreements were required to be
accompanied by a signed statement in which the
tenant certified that his consent was willingly given
19 See note 8 supra.
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and not as the result of coercion, and the tenant
was to be given the right to remain in possession for
at least the period of one year; 2
0
(b) An application could be made to the Commission
for a general increase in rent on a showing by the
landlord of hardship, which the Commission jus-
tified as a failure of the landlord to earn a return
of 6% on the fair value of the property. In deter-
mining the fair value, the Commission was initially
guided by the value as fixed by the courts for local
real estate taxes; 21
(c) Particular tenants were made the subject of pos-
sible applications for rent increases where the rents
paid by them were out of line or considerably lower
than the other frozen rents in the same building for
like accommodations; 22 and finally
(d) Any special inequities which a landlord might pre-
sent to the Commission could form the basis of an
application for a rent increase.2
3
Numerous applications on each 6f these grounds were
promptly filed with the Commission. The Commission em-
ployed a staff of auditors whose duty it was to check the
records submitted by the hotels for the purpose of providing
the Commission with information that was needed intelli-
gently to pass upon these applications. The tenants were
given an opportunity to examine the records of the Commis-
sion and to file, in writing, any objections that they might
have, and these too were presented to the Commission for
consideration.
In a number of cases, as a result of this procedure, in-
creases in rent were ordered by the Commission. As a rule,
such increases did not exceed the 15% but in some instances
20Form RC4 (Appendix A).
21 Form RCS-b (Appendix B).
2 2 Form RCS-a (Appendix C).
23Form RCS-c (Appendix D).
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greater increases were justified by the records and orders
granting them were made by the Commission. 24
In the first case dealing in any comprehensive way with
the authority of the Commission to make such orders, a judge
at nisi prius set aside the order of the Commission on numer-
ous grounds.25  A close examination of the opinion of the
court in that case indicates serious impatience by the court
with the procedure adopted by the Commission and an un-
willingness by the court to recognize that, the primary re-
sponsibility for such orders was with the administrative
agency, and that its orders should not be set aside unless
clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. The ease involved the
Hotel Martinique, which found itself in serious financial
hardship. It was not even earning enough to pay its running
expenses and special concessions had to be made to it even by
labor unions and the mortgage owner.
In the wake of this decision, the same judge, and
others, 20 likewise found fault with the Commission's for-
mulae and with its exercise of administrative discretion. As
this paper goes to press, however, the Appellate Division in
the First Department unanimously upheld the Commission's
power and procedure in these cases, giving to the administra-
tive agency the full rights and powers which other adminis-
trative agencies have enjoyed in recent years by holding that
its orders should not be set aside unless they are clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable. 27 Should the opinion, of the
Appellate Division of the First Department be upheld, it
would mean that the local administrative agency has the
power to adopt reasonable formulae for adjusting inequities
not incompatible with the public welfare, and that its orders
will be sustained even though the courts might be of the opin-
24 Out of a total of 60 applications made by hotels, 55 of which asked for
increases over 15%o, 26 were denied, 15 were granted an increase of 15% or
less; 1 was granted an increase of 40%; 1 granted an increase of 30%; 11
granted an increase ranging from 20 to 29%; and 6 were granted an increase
of 16 to 19%.25 See note 14 supra.26Arnoff v. Ross, 191 Misc. 469, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Beelman v. Ross, - Misc. -- , 78 N. Y. S. 2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1948).27 M oukad v. Ross, - App. Div. -, - N. Y. S. 2d -, 119 N. Y. L. J.
2359 (1st Dep't June 23, 1948).
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ion that the particular order was unwise and that the par-
ticular inequity should have been dealt with differently.
It is not feasible, in this brief review of the Commis-
sion's activities, to deal with the many specific problems
which have arisen with regard to the decisions of the Com-
mission in eviction cases. It will be sufficient to take one
example and indicate how the courts have dealt with the
Commission's determinations in these matters.
Among the grounds upon which the Commission is di-
rected to issue a certificate of eviction is the claim that the
owner of the apartment desires to evict the tenant in order
to occupy the premises himself. Certain safeguards were
thrown around the tenant by the statute, but in the main it
was left to the Commission to determine whether the appli-
cant bona fide intended or needed the apartment for its own
use.28  In its regulations, the Commission had stated that it
would not grant-the petition unless the landlord could show
a compelling necessity 29 for the use of the premises and the
Commission uniformly, in its interpretations, had held that
a compelling necessity meant that the landlord was then liv-
ing under very adverse circumstances himself and that
merely showing that the landlord owned the premises and
preferred to live in the apartment of one of the tenants rather
than in the apartment in which he was then living was in-
sufficient. This regulation met with adverse rulings by the
lower courts." It was generally found that the original
28In Local Laws 1947 (City of Nev York), No. 66, § U41-7.0(6i), the
landlord or purchaser seeking to evict a tenant was required to have paid the
seller, in cash, at least 20% of the purchase price or 20% of the assessed value
of the land together with the structure thereon, whichever was the greater.
29 While the original Local Law No. 66 did not in haec verba require the
showing of immediate and compelling necessity, the Commission nevertheless
held that this requirement was implicit, if the City's emergency were to be met.
3 In re Pruden, 119 N. Y. L. J. 487 (Sup. Ct. February 6, 1948); Matter
of Olsen v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 646 (Sup. Ct. February 19, 1948) ; Matter
of Lawrence v. Ross, 191 Misc. 88, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Matter
of Wallach v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1034 (Sup. Ct. March 19, 1948); Matter
of Roeder v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1065 (Sup. Ct. March 23, 1948) ; Skolnick
v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1278 (Sup. Ct. April 7, 1948); Matter of Lobas v.
Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1362 (Sup. Ct. April 13, 1948); Pinsky v. Ross, 119
N. Y. L. J. 1503 (Sup. Ct April- 22, 1948); Matter of Uriani v. Ross, 119
N. Y. L. J. 1641 (Sup. Ct. May 3, 1948); In re Schroeder (Finkelstein), 119
N. Y. L. J. 1662 (Sup. Ct. May 4, 1948). But cf. Matter of Quattromani v.
Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 882 (Sup. Ct. March 9, 1948).
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statute did not authorize the Commission to do any more
than to inquire if the applicant really owned the property
and had met the statutory prerequisites. If he had, the Com-
mission, said some of the courts, was not authorized to deny
the certificate.3 '
As the application of this rule of law would have re-
sulted in many thousands of evictions, not socially necessary
or desirable, the City Council amended the statute so as to
provide, in express language, that in order to secure a cer-
tificate of eviction from the Commission, the landlord must
show an immediate and compelling necessity to occupy the
demised premises.3 2 The Commission, therefore, was given
the task of determining in each case whether the applicant's
needs were sufficiently great or urgent to require the eviction
of the tenant.
The problems of the Commission were, however, not yet
resolved by this amended statute for the courts immedi-
ately, in three cases, held the new Act to be unconstitu-
tional, in conflict with state legislation and not applicable
retroactively. 3
3
Again, resort was had to the state legislature for the
passage of enabling legislation to validate the amended
Local Law 3 4 and again the Appellate Division, in three de-
cisions simultaneously handed down," reversed the courts at
nisi pri= and upheld the right of the Commission to pass
upon the immediate and compelling necessity of the landlord
to occupy the apartment from which he sought to evict the
tenant. Perhaps the best reasoned judicial opinion and the
most illuminating discussion of the problem is contained in
the opinion of the Appellate Division, in the First Depart-
31 Ibid.
32Local Laws 1947 (City of New York), No. -66, § U41-7.0(c), as
amended, Local Laws 1948 (City of New York), No. 12.33 Matter of Olsen v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 646 (Sup. Ct. February 19,
1948); Matter of Wallach v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1034 (Sup. Ct. March 19,
1948); In re Lombardo, 119 N .Y. L. J. 1201 (Sup. Ct. April 1, 1948).
34Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 669.
35 Matter of Olsen v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1858 (App. Div. 2d Dep't May
18, 1948); Matter of Lombardo v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1858 (App. Div.
2d Dep't May 18, 1948); Matter of Wallach v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1858
(App. Div. 2d Dep't May 18, 1948).
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ment, in Molnar v. Curtin," decided March 15, 1948, the
opinion being written by the very eminent jurist, Mr. Justice
Shientag, and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
without opinion.3  Several problems touching the validity
of Local Law 66 were dealt with by the learned justice. Thus,
the fact that federal legislation, in part, covered the same
field,38 and the problems involved in the application of the
enabling acts, and the restrictive nature of the local legis-
lation were all discussed in the opinion of the court. The
law established by that opinion has served as a guide in many
decisions at nisi prius which followed. It upheld generally
the power of the City Council, under existing circumstances,
with the concurrence of the state legislature to confer the
powers here involved upon an administrative agency, and
upheld the administrative agency in the exercise of these
powers in a reasonable and non-arbitrary manner.
In all, nearly six hundred and eighty-seven applica-
tions 39 were brought before the Supreme Court of the state
to test the validity of the Commission's orders and while the
Commission was at first not successful and met stormy oppo-
sition in the courts, after the enabling acts were passed and
after the various departments of the Appellate Division and
the Court of Appeals had upheld its powers, the number of
occasions upon which orders of the Commission have been
set aside have steadily diminished and the authority of the
Commission has thus been firmly established. 40
36273 App. Div. 322, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 553 (lst Dep't 1948).
37297 N. Y. 967, - N. E. - (1948).
3S "Finally, Local Law No. 66 validated by the enactment of chapter 4 of
the Laws of 1948, is not in conflict with the Federal Housing and Rent Act
of 1947. The differences between the Federal law and the local law are not
of such a character as to render one inconsistent with the other. . . . States
and municipalities may adopt legislation dealing with the same subject as a
Federal statute and designed to assist in its enforcement.... The present
Federal law makes no provision for obtaining a certificate of eviction from
the Federal rent agency as prerequisite to a proceeding for eviction under the
State law. The local law now requires that such a certificate be obtained
from the local rent commission. There is no doubt that the local law can be
enforced without clashing with the Federal law and without in any way im-
pairing that statute." 273 App. Div. 322, 325, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 553, 557 (1st
Dep't 1948).
39 From December 7, 1947 to June 30, 1948, this number of applications
was brought before the court on mandamus proceedings (N. Y. Crv. PRAc.
Acr Art. 78, §§ 1283-1306).
40June 1 to June 15, 1948, statistics show that out of 66 petitions to review
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It would exceed the bounds of this paper to enter into
a detailed discussion of these numerous cases. One point,
however, deserves special attention, and that is the obliga-
tion of the Commission to grant oral hearings to tenants
who request them. The Commission has adopted the prin-
ciple of permitting tenants to file objections, in writing, after
affording them an opportunity to examine the material in
the hands of the Commission upon which the application is
based, but it has reserved to itself the right to refuse an oral
hearing where, in its judgment, such a hearing is neither
required nor feasible. 41 Obviously, where a hotel is applying
for an adjustment of rents and several hundred tenants are
involved, it would not be feasible to hold an oral hearing,
subjecting the parties to examination and cross-examination
which might endlessly prolong and postpone the determina-
tion. This is especially true when the issues of fact to be
determined are matters of bookkeeping and where the Com-
mission itself has at its command a staff of impartial ac-
countants to check the facts. Nevertheless, the failure to
grant such oral hearings was made one of the bases for set-
ting aside the Commission's orders in at least two cases,
42
one of which has already been reversed by the Appellate
Division of the First Department,43 which specifically held
that under the circumstances oral hearings were not re-
quired.44  Likewise, the better view is that the Commission
the Commission's orders, 23 were voluntarily withdrawn; in 2 cases the Com-
mission, on its own order, changed its decisions; 28 were denied or dismissed
by the Court; 2 were granted by the Court. There are still 11 pending or
open cases.,41 Regulation II, Article I, Section 6d-The Commission may direct the
holding of hearings with regard to any application before it or a deputy ap-
pointed by it, if in its judgment such hearings are necessary.
42 Moukad v. Ross, 191 Misc. 270, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Beelcm'an v. Ross, - Misc. -, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
43 Moukad v. Ross, - App. Div. -, - N. Y. S. 2d -, 119 N. Y. L. J.
2359 (1st Dep't June 23, 1948).
44 "The Commission is an administrative agency, and in its consideration of
the application of the Hotel Martinique Inc., for an increase in the rent of
controlled rooms, it acted in an administrative capacity. The Commission, in
this respect at least, was not acting in a judicial capacity or as a quasi-judicial
body, and it was not necessary, therefore, that the Commission hold a hearing
as between the Hotel and the tenants." - App. Div.-, - N. Y. S. 2d -,
119 N. Y. L. J. 2359 (1st Dep't June 23, 1948).
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is not required to hold oral hearings in eviction cases; 45
but in these eases, where the parties are few and the issues
are simple, the Commission does generally have oral hearings
before hearing officers, wherever issues of fact are raised by
the paities which require quasi-judicial determination by
the Commission.
A governmental body, organized to meet a specific emer-
gency and designed to cope with a problem which is essen-
tially economic rather than legal, and to deal with rights
which are newly created and do not have the authority of
tradition, and which is not equipped with a body of case law
stemming from the ancient books, is of necessity an imper-
fect creature. Its errors may be numerous and the courts
must be alert to check any excesses which such a hastily
organized body may from time to time commit. But the
smooth operation of government here, as elsewhere, requires
that administrative agents, whose function is to make speedy
judgments on matters within the range of expert knowledge,
should be accorded the basic rights and privileges of all ad-
ministrative agencies. A complicated society like ours could
hardly function if the air-tight separation of powers into
judicial, executive and legislative were strictly adhered to.
Time has shown that it is often necessary to fuse these powers
into temporary and permanent agencies, and thus has grown
up the great body of administrative law with which this cen-
tury has become so familiar. The Temporary City Housing
Rent Commission, established by the City of New York to
meet a grave crisis in the affairs of the city, is a conspicuous
example of this governmental process.
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN.
45 
"Local Law 66, constituting section U41-7.0, subdivision M, which was
validated by Chapter 699 of the Laws of 1948, gives the commission the power
to adopt, promulgate, amend or rescind such rules, regulations or orders as
the commission may deem necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of
this section. Pursuant to such provision of the law, the commission adopted
subdivision D of section 2 of their rules and regulations, which provides:
'The commission may direct the holding of oral hearing with regard to any
application before it or a deputy appointed by it if in its judgment such hear-
ings are necessary.' It would, therefore, seem entirely within the discretion
of the commission as to whether a hearing should be had . .. ." Norton, J.,
Friedland v. Ross, 119 N. Y. L. J. 1859 (Sup. Ct. May 18, 1948).
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(APPENDIX A)
Form No. RC4
Temporary City Housing Rent Commission
500 Park Avenue
New York City









The undersigned Landlord hereby applies for an adjustment of rent.
This application is based upon the following inequities, to wit:
(Here state briefly grounds for application for adjustment.)
Rent for above room or apartment paid on June 30, 1947
-.......... . . per
Rent after voluntary agreement $ ................................................ per
The increased rent is embodied in a lease dated and expiring not earlier than
December 31, 1948, a copy of which is hereto attached.
................................................... . .. Landlord
The undersigned represent that the agreement to pay the above increased
rent was voluntarily negotiated and entered into without coercion or duress
of any kind whatsoever.
................................. ................... Landlord
........................................ ... Tenant
(Note: This application will not be considered unless the lease is for a period
expiring not earlier than December 31, 1948, at the option of the Tenant and
expressly provides the same service afforded to the Tenant by the Landlord
as of June 30, 1947. The Commission may, if the facts warrant, institute
proceedings, after notice to the Landlord and Tenant, to reduce the rent to
that in effect on June 30, 1947.)
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(APPENDIX B)
Form No. RC5-b
TEMPORARY CITY HOUSING RENT COMMISSION
500 Park Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.





Name of Person in Charge
The undersigned Landlord hereby applies for adjustment of rents, to be
effective on ............................................................ on the ground that the rents it
presently receives do not afford a reasonable return on the fair value of the
investment in the hotel property.
In support of this application Landlord submits the following summary:
1. Fair value of investment in hotel property
(From Statement A) $ ................................................
2. Amount of reasonable return on above value
claimed (From Statement B) $ ................................................
3. Profit or loss earned on the basis of maximum
rents now in effect, as adjusted in accordance
with Statement D $ ................................................
4. Excess of Item 2 over Item 3 $ ................................................
S. Amount of adjustment applied for $ ...............................................
6. The total annual maximum rents of Tenants
whose rents are to be adjusted (From
Statement F) $ ................................................
In further support of this application, Landlord submits the following
statements:
SCHEDULE OF STATEMENTS
STATEMENT A. Proof of fair value of the investment, including land,
building, furniture and working capital. (The assessed value will be accepted
as prima facie evidence of the fair value of land and building.)
STATEMENT B. Proof of amount of reasonable return on the fair value
of the investment. (Six per centum will be accepted as a reasonable rate of
return without further proof.)
STATEMENT C. Comparative Profit and Loss Summary (1) for the last
fiscal year, (2) for the current fiscal year to the end of a month ended not more
than 60 days prior to the date of application, and (3) for the corresponding
months of the preceding fiscal year. (These statements shall be in sufficient
detail to show separately each major classification of sales and income, cost of
sales, and expenses. Repairs and maintenance, real estate taxes, depreciation
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of building, and depreciation of furniture and furnishings must be shown
separately.)
STATEMENT D. Profit or loss earned on the basis of maximum rents now
in effect. The profit or loss after depreciation but before deduction of interest
charges and Federal income taxes, taken from the profit and loss statement
for the last fiscal year, and all known adjustments claimed, such as present
trend indicated in Statement C, changes in wage rates and in taxes. (Each
adjustment must be supported by proper proof.)
STATEMENT E. Proof of reasonableness of deductions for repairs and
maintenance and for depreciation. (As to repairs and maintenance, show this
expense for each of last five years, analyzed in the same manner as in the
books of account. If the deduction in Statement C is not adjusted in State-
ment D, and if it is substantially different from the average for preceding
years, explain. As to depreciation, if the basis used in Statement C is not
adjusted in Statement D, explain the basis used and state the basis used in
Federal income tax returns and whether or not such basis was accepted as a
result of an examination of the returns.)
STATEMENT F. Proposed apportionment of the rent adjustment applied
for. (Show, as to each room or apartment (1) number of room or apart-
ment, (2) name of tenant, (3) last date on which maximum rent under
FEDERAL control was effective, (4) amount of last ORC (Federal) maxi-
mum rate, (5) maximum rate at June 30, 1947, (6) maximum rate at date
of this application, (7) proposed maximum rate.
STATEMENT G. Proof that the maximum rents, after giving effect to the
adjustment applied for, will not exceed the rents actually received for com-
parable rooms or apartments from occupants whose rents are not under the
control of this Commission. (Submit list of all rooms or apartments not
under control of this Commission and show, as to each, (1) room or apart-
ment number, (2) last date on which ORC maximum rent was in effect,(3) amount of last ORC maximum rent, (4) maximum rate at June 30, 1947,
(5) highest adjusted maximum rate approved by this Commission, and (6) ac-
tual rate received at a date not more than 30 days prior to this application.
(Submit also such explanations as will facilitate making comparisons between
adjusted rents applied for and actual rents received for rooms or apartments
not under control.)
Landlord is willing to execute a lease for each Tenant whose rent will
be increased at least 15% as a result of this application. Such lease shall be
for a term'ending on a date to be determined by the Commission at the time
the increase is granted, but not later than December 31, 1948, and it shall
expressly provide that Landlord will maintain the services afforded to the
Tenant by the Landlord as of June 30, 1947.
.............. ......... ............ ............. .... ........ ..... ,...... .........
Landlord
By
O fficial Title ......................................................








APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT (COMPARABILITY)
Date°.....................
Name of Establishment ......................................................................... Date Rec'd
A ddress .................................................................................. .
Name of Landlord ................................................................................. Date Notices
Mailed:
Name of Person in Charge ....................................................................
The undersigned Landlord hereby applies for adjustment of rents as listed in
Schedule A below, to be effective on ...... .................................  on the ground
that these Tenants pay lower rents than the maximum rents of other Tenants who
occupy similar rooms (or apartments):
SCHEDULE A. (Fill in number of persons only if it affects amount of rent.)
No. of Present Adjusted Maximum RentRoom or Name of Tenant Pers. Maximum Rent Applied for
Apt. No. $ Per -$ $ Allowed LeaseEffective todate (Date)
In support of this application Landlord submits the information contained in
Schedules B and C. Landlord represents that the rooms (or apartments) listed in
Schedules A and B have the same, or larger, floor area, the same or better arrange-
ment and conveniences, and are at least as desirable as to outlook, furnishings, and
physical condition, as those listed in Schedule C. Landlord further represents that
there are no rooms (or apartments) in this establishment similar to those listed in
Schedules A and B except those listed in Schedule C.
Landlord is willing to execute a lease for each Tenant whose rent will be in-
creased at least 15% as a result of this application. Such lease shall be for a term
ending on a date to be determined by the Commission at the time the increase is
granted, but not later than December 31, 1948, and it shall expressly provide that
Landlord will maintain the services afforded to the Tenant by the Landlord as of
June 30, 1947.
Approved by the Commission as indicated ................................Landor................................
in the last three columns of Schedule A.
Date: By: By
.............................. (  t l  ........ Of.............. ...(Title) 0.fi iT te ....... .................................
I ....., ........ ........ I.... .. ........................
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SCHEDULE B. Additional information as to rooms (or apartments) listed in
Schedule A.
Last Maximum Rent Under Maximum Rent Under City Control
Room or No. of Federal Control at June 30, 1947. At date of appl. (Leave
Apt. No. Pers. Last date on which it was effective $ Per $ Per blank)
$ Per
NOTE: Fill in No. of Persons only if it affects amount of rent.
SCHEDULE C. Information as to similar rooms (or apartments):
Last Maximum Rent Under Maximum Rent Under City Control
Room or No. of Federal Control at June 30, 1947. At date of appl. (Leave
Apt. No. Pers. Last date on which it was effective $ Per $ Per blank)
$ PerIn - - - .
REMARKS:
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Form No. RCS-c
APPLICATION FOR ADJUSTMENT (INEQUITY)
File TwoCopies
Dateo........................
Name of Establishment Date Notices
Address Mailed
Name of Landlord
Name of Person in Charge ......
The undersigned Landlord hereby applies for adjustment of rents, to be
effective on ..................... .. on the ground that the rents it
presently receives are inequitable.
In support of this application Landlord submits the following summary:
1. The total annual maximum rents of Tenants
whose rents are to be adjusted (From
Statement A ) $ ...............................................
2. Total amount of adjustment applied for (From
Statement A) $ .....................................
3. A concise statement of the inequity on which Landlord relies as the basis
for this application:
In further support of this application, Landlord submits the following
statements:
STATEMENT A. Proposed apportionment of the rent adjustment applied
for. (Show, as to each room or apartment (1) number of room or apart-
ment, (2) name of tenant, (3) furnished or unfurnished, (4) last date on
which maximum rent under FEDERAL control was effective, (5) amount of
last ORC (Federal) maximum rate, (6) maximum rate at June 30, 1947,
(7) maximum rate at date of this application, (8) proposed maximum rate.
STATEMENT B. A complete and detailed statement of the inequity on
which Landlord relies as the basis for this application. (Inclusion of proof
of the facts submitted in this statement will avoid delay in processing the
application.)
Landlord is willing to comply with the terms and conditions prescribed
by the Order of the Commission with respect to this application.
............. .......... ,., .. o....°o.......... . *. .. ° .......... ,.... .
Landlord
By .,........... ... ....... , ...
Official Title ................................
